This paper reviews the recent literature on equity home bias -the empirical finding that people overinvest in domestic stocks relative to the theoretically optimal investment portfolio. We cover different home bias measures and we illustrate the extent and the evolution of equity home bias both with recent portfolio holdings data and longer time series. Institutional-based and behavior-based explanations for the puzzle are considered and discussed. We conclude that none of the proposed theories can explain the full extent of the bias by itself, thus we argue that international portfolio choice should be explained by a mixture of rational and irrational behavior. * Rosanne Vanpée, the corresponding author (rosanne.vanpee@econ.kuleuven.be) gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fonds for Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Vlaanderen (FWO-Vlaanderen).
Introduction
Although international portfolio theory prescribes that optimal portfolios should be well diversified internationally, in practice investors have a clear preference for domestic assets. In the finance literature, this is called the home bias puzzle. Excellent literature reviews on home bias up to the year 2000 can be found in Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) . In this paper, we cover only the recent findings on international portfolio choice, to avoid too much overlap with the work of Lewis and Karolyi and Stulz. Studies that attempt to resolve the equity home bias puzzle primarily focus on institutional explanations or individual investor behavior.
Institutional-based explanations for home bias include hedging possibilities against domestic risks, trading costs and border controls, information asymmetries, and country-level and firmlevel governance. A behavioral-based explanation focuses on investor-specific characteristics such as familiarity, patriotism and overconfidence. We discuss each potential explanation for the equity home bias and argue that no single explanation can capture the full extent of international underdiversification on its own. Home bias is probably caused by a mixture of both institutional and behavioral biases, and therefore it is a very complex task to find a theoretical model that correctly describes actual portfolio choice.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we review the various measures of the equity home bias, we illustrate how severely underdiversified actual equity portfolios are, and we show that the equity home bias has decreased slightly over time. In Section 2, we illustrate the potential benefits of international diversification and compare these benefits with the implicit costs of holding foreign stocks. Section 3 covers the explanations for the equity home bias brought forward in the literature, and the final section concludes.
The equity home bias: facts and figures
Equity home bias refers to the empirical finding that investors deliberately tilt their portfolios towards domestic assets and thus forego important diversification benefits offered by an internationally well-spread portfolio. It has been shown that home bias is not restricted to an international setting. Even within borders there seems to be a tendency for investors to bias their portfolios towards firms that are situated in their own region. To avoid confusion and to be consistent with the literature, we call the preference for domestic assets "home bias" and the preference for local assets within one country "local bias". In the next subsection, we describe how home bias can be measured.
How to measure the equity home bias
The interpretation of and explanation for the equity home bias depends on the characterization of the benchmark weights, i.e. those to which actual holdings can be compared. Following
Baele, Pungulescu and Ter Horst (2007), we make a distinction between a "model-based" approach and a "data-based" approach to measure home bias.
In a "model-based"approach, one can use the optimal portfolio weights from an international asset-pricing model as benchmark weights to compare with actual portfolio holdings.
The world CAPM assumes that every investor is of the mean-variance type and has the same beliefs about the distribution of real asset returns. All investors face identical investment opportunities and there are no transaction costs or taxes. Inflation is independent of asset returns (or zero) and there is no exchange rate risk. These assumptions result in the well-known relationship:
where E(r j ) and E(r w ) denote the expected returns on any asset and the world portfolio respectively, r is the risk-free rate, and β j := cov(r w , r j )/var(r w ). The world CAPM implies that all investors hold the world market portfolio, which is a portfolio where the weight of each asset is equal to its relative share in the world market capitalization. The international asset pricing model (InCAPM) of Sercu (1980) takes exchange rates into account, and equation (1) becomes
where N is the number of countries in the world, s denotes the exchange rate change and r is now the risk-free rate of reference country N . In Sercu's model, currency risk can be perfectly hedged with the investor's own risk-free asset, implying that all investors hold the world market portfolio of risky assets, as in the world CAPM. Thus, in either model, the home-bias measure is equal to the difference between the optimal CAPM foreign country weight in the portfolio and observed holdings of foreign equities:
The empirical validity of the world CAPM and the InCAPM is tested by the equations:
r j − r = α j + β j (r w − r) + ε j (world CAPM) (4) r j − r = α j + β j (r w − r) +
with r j and r w the observed returns on the portfolio j and the world portfolio of equities. If the intercept α is significantly different from zero, the CAPM is empirically invalid. In practice, the empirical validity of the CAPM is very weak and its assumption of perfectly integrated markets is untenable (Ferson and Harvey, 1994) . This is even more evident if we evaluate the prediction that all investors should hold the same portfolio.
Alternatively, in a "data-based" approach, benchmark portfolio weights can be calculated from a mean-variance optimization problem with sample estimates of the means and variances of stock returns. The mean-variance framework dates back form Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1963) . In a setting with N risky assets with expected return r n (n = 1, 2, . . . , N ), collected in a vector R and a covariance matrix Ω, and a risk free asset with return r, investors make a portfolio choice that has a desired expected return m and a variance that is as small as possible:
where x denotes the (N × 1) vector of all risky asset weights in the portfolio and 1 is a (N × 1)
vector of ones. The portfolio weights of risky assets are then equal to:
with R e = R − 1r the vector of expected excess returns of the risky assets, and x is rescaled such that all elements in x sum to unity.
The problem with the data-based approach is that expected returns are unobserved and thus actual returns should be used to calculate the optimal portfolio weights. However, realized returns are bad proxies for expected returns (Merton, 1980) . The effect of imprecisely estimated expected returns on the estimated portfolio holdings is worsened by the fact that the optimal portfolio weights are highly sensitive to changes in expected returns. This high sensitivity arises from the fact that the returns of the industrialized countries are highly positively correlated and thus the estimated covariance matrix is close to singular (Jeske, 2001) . Therefore, the data-based approach can result in extreme and volatile equity positions.
Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that the definition of the equity home bias as the difference between the proportional domestic equity investments and the proportional market capitalization -the benchmark portfolio of the model-based approachis incorrect. This is because the total market capitalization of stocks also contains those assets that are not freely tradable due to, for instance, controlling shareholders who are reluctant to sell their shares. Thus, regular investors cannot hold the world market portfolio; at best, they buy a share in the world portfolio of shares not held by controlling shareholders. Therefore, Baele et al. find that the purely model-based approach leads to a severe overestimation of the equity home bias. Using a Bayesian approach that accounts for distrust in the model, the average home bias measure is 22% lower than the one implied by the model-based approach.
Sercu and Vanpée (2007a) develop a data-based home bias measure that is deducted from mean-variance portfolio theory, notably the difference between the covariance risk of asset i in foreign investor l's portfolio and the covariance risk of asset i in investor i's portfolio:
where r h i denotes the hedged equity return of the foreign (host) country i, and r h p(l) is the hedged return of the observed portfolio of home country investor l. 1 One advantage of this home bias measure is that it only relies on the estimation of the covariance matrix of risky assets and on the actual international portfolio holdings. Merton (1980) shows that the variancecovariance matrix of risky assets can be estimated with far more precision than expected 1 The equity return r h i , is stock i's return hedged for exchange rate risk and stock market returns that are not included in the sample. We return to the Sercu-Vanpée model in Section 2.
returns. However, a correct estimation of the covariance matrix remains crucial for the SercuVanpée home bias measure: Sercu and Vanpée (2007b) show empirically that a simple historical covariance matrix can lead to home bias measures for the emerging markets that are incorrect and severely overestimated, notably when the estimates fail to take into account that the Asian crisis is long over, and unlikely to return soon. A far better result is obtained when a Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) TGARCH-model is used to estimate the covariance matrix, which gives more weight to recent returns and accounts for asymmetries in the feedback mechanism.
In the next subsection, we illustrate the equity home bias with recent data on international portfolio holdings and show the evolution of international diversification over time.
The home bias in figures
To illustrate the intensity of the home bias, Table 1 Table 1 shows that all countries hold significantly home-biased equity portfolios.
The equity home bias is the lowest in the Netherlands, where only 32 percent of the total equity portfolio is invested in domestic stocks, and the highest in Indonesia, where nearly all equity investments are domestic. In general, the equity home bias is lower in the developed countries and higher in emerging markets. It is interesting to note that the countries with the most volatile stock markets (the emerging markets) are also the ones with their equity portfolios most heavily tilted towards domestic assets. This means that either domestic investors of those countries bear a substantial amount of unrewarded country-specific risk, or international investors are unwilling to cash in an expected return for a risk that, to them, is diversified away. The challenge for academics thus is to explain this behavior.
1.3 Evolution of the equity home bias over time Baele, Pungulescu and Ter Horst (2007) show empirically that the home bias has come down over the years, especially in EU-member states since the European integration. We show in Figure 1 that also for non-EU countries there has been a modest trend towards more diversification. The equity home bias has decreased slightly over the years. In the next section we turn to the costs of international portfolios, or similarly the forgone gains of diversification.
The costs of underdiversification
The costs of underdiversification can be studied using various approaches. We first discuss the estimated costs resulting from a mean-variance portfolio approach and compare these with the gains from diversification calculated with a consumption-based approach. In a third subsection we report the costs of underdiversification calculated by Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) using individual portfolio holdings data.
Diversification costs under a mean-variance approach
In a mean-variance framework, home bias can result from a difference between domestic and foreign investors in the expected returns and/or in the risks (covariance structure) of the assets in the investment set. Several studies consider models where investors adjust their expected 
where x act is the vector of actual portfolio shares, µ−r1 is the vector expected excess returns, γ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), and Ω is the covariance matrix of risky asset returns. The difference between historical returns and the implied returns derived from equation (9) is interpreted as the implicit costs of foreign investments. Returns are deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to control for inflation risk. with historical mean returns to measure the costs of foreign investments is problematic for several reasons. First, realized returns are very bad proxies for expected returns because their estimates are extremely noisy (Merton, 1980; Elton, 1999 ) and a simple mean historical return does not account for the fact that expected returns can be time-varying. Second, the results are dependent on a postulated and perhaps debatable value for relative risk aversion. Third, the methodology does not account for omitted assets, notably long-term bonds, or non-traded assets, nor for exchange rate risk.
The international portfolio holdings model of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) is an extension of the international CAPM of Adler and Dumas (1983) and Sercu (1980) ; it accounts for both domestic inflation risk and deadweight costs of foreign investments. In a setting with N countries and N currencies, there are N equity assets, N − 1 foreign currency bills or notes and a nominally risk free asset. A crucial assumption of the model is that when an investor l holds a foreign asset i, he experiences a proportional deadweight loss C l i . Under these assumptions, the vector of optimal portfolio holdings of risky assets is equal to: (10) with the covariance matrix of (hedged) stock returns, and, similar to Cooper and Kaplanis, they construct an expression that is independent of expected returns: 
where x l l denotes the proportion of domestic investors' portfolios allocated to domestic equity, x * l is country l's market share in the world market portfolio and σ l,w is the covariance of country l's equity return with the world market portfolio return. The term
the degree of home bias and can also be interpreted as the degree of market integration. The model implies that the degree of the home bias will induce a larger cost of capital if σ 2 l > σ l,w . Empirical evidence shows that this is generally the case (for instance Stulz, 1999 Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999) show empirically that the estimated costs from underdiversification as calculated from a traditional mean-variance approach are overstated. They find that U.S. investors can mimic foreign market indices and achieve a portfolio that is internationally mean-variance efficient by using domestically traded multinationals, closed-end country funds and American Depository Receipts. The difference between the gains from a home-made diversified portfolio and a portfolio composed of shares trading abroad are statistically and economically insignificant. However, they also find that although the average gains from foreign asset-based diversification are insignificant, there are periods when international markets provide a meaningful diversification that can not be replicated at home. The study of Errunza et al. is carried out from the viewpoint of the U.S. investors. Investors from other countries, especially emerging markets, probably have less opportunities to compose an internationally mean-variance efficient portfolio using domestically traded assets.
We now turn to the costs of international underdiversification resulting from a consumptionbased approach.
2 The PEG ratio model is developed by Easton (2004) and states that the market price of a firm's stock at time t, pt can be determined as pt =
, wherext+τ represents the expected future earnings per share for period (t + τ − 1, t + τ ),d t+τ denotes the expected future net dividends per share for period (t + τ − 1, t + τ ) and rP EG is the implied cost of capital.
Diversification costs under a consumption-based approach
As an alternative to the mean-variance portfolio theory approach, the implied costs of underdiversification can be calculated using a consumption-based approach that takes a production process as exogenously given and determines how optimal risk-sharing would affect the in- We illustrate the consumption-based methodology using the work of Lewis (1996 Lewis ( , 2000 .
Calculating the welfare gains from diversification under a consumption-based approach requires the specification of a utility function. A commonly used utility function is the Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function: 3
where θ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. In a world with N closed economies (autarky), let p (13), given his budget constraint. Specifically, the optimization problem is:
The first order condition for this maximization problem, and the assumption of a log-normal distribution for the endowments, leads to following expression for the stock price:
where
Lewis (1996, 2000) shows that the maximization problem can also be written in terms of a world mutual fund paying out the world per capita endowment, e t . Shares of the mutual fund held by country j are defined as x j t and its price at time t is p t . The price of the world mutual fund, p t and country j's stock price, p j t can expressed as:
is the exponential of the risk-adjusted growth rate of the world endowment, and H j = exp(µ j + 1 2 γσ 2 − γσ j ), with σ j the covariance between country j's endowment growth and the world endowment growth. A country's stock price will increase with its mean growth rate, µ j , and decrease with its covariance with the world endowment, σ j , ceteris paribus.
Recall that the welfare gain from international diversification is defined as the percentage of permanent consumption that must be taken away from an individual to make him indifferent between risk-sharing or not. If C j 0 is the permanent consumption at time 0 for country j, and C j * 0 is its permanent consumption under optimal risk-sharing, the welfare gain δ j can be derived from following relationship:
where C 0 is the stream of world per capita endowments. Using the expressions for the stock prices p j and p, the welfare gain can be calculated as:
Thus, the welfare gain for international diversification depends on the utility under autarky relative to the optimal world portfolio, and on the ratio of the value of domestic equity to world equity. for each portfolio is of the same order of magnitude as the spread in expected returns across the portfolio. Another problem with the consumption-based model is that it is not only weak in fitting the data, but it also leads to levels for risk aversion that are too high to be plausible.
For example, to obtain the best fit for the data, Cochrane (1996) had to impose a risk aversion parameter of 241. The underlying explanation may have to do with the fact that, even in the U.S., consumers' spending is not closely tied to the stock market. Many do not hold stocks, others still derive most of their income from other sources, and even pure rentiers may be less sensitive to prices than theory predicts.
In the next subsection, we consider the costs from underdiversification derived from data on individual portfolio holdings directly instead of from a theoretical model.
Diversification costs from individual portfolio holdings
Goetzmann and Kumar (2004), using a large sample of individual portfolio holdings during the period 1991-1996, calculate the costs of underdiversification by dividing portfolios into groups based on the degree of diversification. Using CAPM-tests and four-factor alphas, they find that the least diversified group of investors earn 2.4 percent lower annual returns than the most diversified group of investors. This performance differential is not due to differences in turnover or transactions costs. Goetzmann and Kumar show that the degree of diversification is related to specific investor characteristics: the economic costs of underdiversification are higher for older investors and investors who trade infrequently. Within these two groups, the risk-adjusted performance differentials between the least diversified and the most diversified investors are 3.60 percent and 3.12 percent, respectively.
Overall, there seems to be a consensus that the gains from international diversification can be substantial. Therefore, the observed preference for domestic equity is even more puzzling.
In the next section we consider the various explanations that have been brought forward for the observed home-biased portfolios.
Explanations for the equity home bias
The list of potential explanations for the equity home bias is extensive. We distinguish between five theories: (i ) hedging domestic risk, (ii ) implicit and explicit costs of foreign investments, (iii ) information asymmetries, (iv ) corporate governance and transparency, and (v ) behavioral biases.
Hedging domestic risks
A first potential explanation for the home bias in equity portfolios is that domestic assets serve as a better hedge for risks that are home-country specific, e.g. inflation risk and domestic consumption risk, since investments in domestic assets are likely to follow the performance of the domestic market in general. We discuss four home-country specific risks in turn: inflation risk, real exchange rate risk, domestic consumption risk, and the risk from non-tradable wealth components such as human capital and non-financial income. He shows theoretically that the equation
with r f the gross return of foreign stocks and r d the gross return on domestic stocks, should hold if an investor's relative allocation between domestic and foreign securities is optimal, and
if
]. The right-hand side of equation (23) measures the extent to which foreign securities are a better hedge against domestic consumption risks than domestic securities.
Thus, it is optimal for a domestic investor to hold relatively more foreign securities when
Chue finds that even though foreign equities can help diversify away domestic stock market None of the studies that consider hedging as an explanation for the home bias in equities can provide truly convincing results. Hedging domestic risks cannot qualify as the single explanation for international underdiversification. We turn to the next possible explanation: investing in foreign equities generates costs that are higher than the possible gains from diversification.
Costs and barriers for foreign investments
Most of the early literature that tries to explain home bias focuses on transaction costs and the role of barriers to international investments. Black (1974) develops a model with taxes on net foreign investments that leads to a tilt in portfolios towards domestic assets. These taxes are broadly defined and can represent for instance the risk of expropriation of foreign holdings, direct controls on capital in-or outflows, reserve requirements on bank deposits and restrictions on the fraction of a company that can be held by foreigners. Other early studies on the effect of costs and barriers to foreign investments on international portfolio holdings are amongst others Stulz (1981) and Errunza and Losq (1985) . At that time, it was not unrealistic to assume that explicit barriers cause home-biased portfolios. For many investors, investing in foreign securities was almost impossible because their country forbade them to do so, or made it difficult or impossible for them to obtain foreign currency. Since the early nineties, nearly all countries have liberalized their financial markets, at least to a certain extent. These days, all developed markets and a number of emerging markets are open to foreign investors. In other words, equity home bias, which is highly persistent and still prevalent, cannot be explained by international capital controls.
Another explicit market friction brought forward as an explanation for the home bias are that the turnover rate on foreign equity is far higher than on domestic equity. Warnock (2001) reexamines this finding, and concludes that foreign turnover rates are similar to domestic turnover rates, but transaction costs still fail as an explanation for home bias. Thus, direct costs do not offer a complete or even a major explanation for the home bias. We turn to the third potential explanation, information asymmetries between foreign and domestic investors.
Information asymmetries
A very popular potential explanation for home bias is that the preference for domestic assets is driven by information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. Indeed, if there is differential information, risk-averse investors prefer the stocks on which they easily have better information -these are typically the domestic stocks -because they perceive them as less risky. Similarly, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) suggest that "economic distance" as measured by, for instance, air fares or phone rates data, may be a good proxy for information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors.
There are some difficulties with the assumption of asymmetric information as an explanation for home bias. If investors have better or more information on domestic assets, they not only face a lower variance of domestic equity returns, but also their expected returns should often differ from those of foreign investors. This difference in expected returns depends on whether domestic investors observe a signal indicating high or low returns on domestic stocks.
Thus, at least in some episodes, informed investors would have to hold fewer domestic stocks than foreigners do, notably if the information indicates a sufficiently low expected return.
However, this investment behavior is in contract to actual portfolio holdings, which indicate a continued home bias over decades in all countries (Jeske, 2001) .
A second problem with the information-based explanation of home bias is the existence of many index vehicles through which the information disadvantage relative to foreign investors can be largely avoided. Errunza et al. (1999) show empirically that the benefits from an We now turn to the fourth explanation for equity home bias, notably cross-country differences in corporate governance and transparency.
Corporate governance and transparency
Recent studies have suggested that corporate governance and transparency on the firm-level and political risk on the country-level can also be a driver for equity home bias. There is a both government and corporate transparency and international investments into a particular country; and Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that the quality of a company's corporate governance not only affects the stocks held in investors' portfolios, but also the probability of new investors buying stocks in a company. (2006) show that in countries with weak governance and weak institutions, concentrated ownership is optimal. Consequently, for home bias to disappear in countries with weak public governance, the development of institutions that support decentralized ownership is crucial.
The fifth explanation for home bias, which we discuss next, is based on behavioral finance.
Behavioral-based explanations
All possible explanations for international underdiversification brought forward so far, rely on the traditional research methodology that is based on the assumption of perfectly rational behavior of individuals. However, psychologists and experimental economists have found that in an experimental setting, people tend to suffer from a wishful-thinking bias and self-control problems. They often make judgments using the representativeness heuristic, meaning that when they judge the probability that a model is true, people base their estimate on the degree to which the data resemble the model, rather than making appropriate probability calculations.
Since the development of the prospect theory by Kaheman and Tversky (1979) There is a significantly positive relation between age and diversification and income and di-versification (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2004) . Karlsson and Nordén (2007) find that men have a tendency to be relatively more home-biased than women. A potential explanation for this finding is that men are more overconfident than women (Barber and Odean, 2001) .
A problem with a behavioral-based explanation for home bias is that psychological constructs are difficult to measure and to distinguish. For instance, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that Finnish investors prefer assets controlled by Finnish-speaking managers. They argue that investors prefer domestic companies because they are more familiar with them. But alternative explanations for their findings are that Finns are simply more patriotic towards Finnish firms, or that domestic investors do have actual information advantages relative to foreigners since they understand the language and local culture better. Unobservable psychological attributes, such as overconfidence, are central to the behavioral approach. They are often proxied by objective investor attributes such as age and gender. However, one can argue whether gender is a good proxy to measure a subjective attribute such as overconfidence. Another way to handle subjective investor attributes is the use of questionnaires or experiments. Two problems can emerge in this case. First, if multiple proxies are proposed to measure the same attribute, it is often the case that individuals' responses are poorly correlated across proxies.
Second, questionnaire-or experiment-based studies are difficult to extend to other populations, the proxies used may lose their validity for other populations (Dorn and Huberman, 2005) .
Nowadays, the most popular explanations for the equity home bias are information asymmetries, governance issues, and behavioral biases, as the other proposed explanations seem to fail empirically in explaining much of the actual portfolio choices of investors. Researchers are still debating whether rational decision making (information asymmetries) or bounded rationality (behavioral finance) are the right track to follow. Ke, Ng and Wang (2006) try to determine whether the foreign investment decisions of professional money managers are influenced by information asymmetries rather than by investment in the familiar. They find no supporting evidence for the information-based explanation and therefore tend to conclude that the preference for physically proximate investments is driven by psychological familiarity issues.
In contrast, Massa and Simonov (2006) argue that familiarity-driven investment decisions are a rational response to information constraints and not a behavioral heuristic. DeMarzo, Kaniel
and Kremer (2004) find that the impact of familiarity depends on the degree to which the investor is informed: more informed investors are less affected by familiarity. They conclude that the investment choice is driven by the availability of information, and that familiarity is a substitute for better information.
Still, a single explanation for home bias in equity portfolios may very well be non-existent.
We believe that all explanations discussed in this literature review are valuable. The home bias puzzle is a complex one and a result of a mixture of rational and irrational behavioral of investors, and cross-country institutional differences.
Conclusion
This paper covers the recent empirical findings and theoretical reasonings for the equity home bias -the fact that people overinvest in domestic stocks. We first show that the intensity of home bias dependens on the way it is measured. We illustrate the degree of international underdiversification for the year 2005, and we show that there has been a modest trend towards more diversification over the last twenty years.
The implicit costs of investing abroad vary significantly depending on the level of development of the home and especially the host country. But also the way these costs are measured matters: a consumption-based approach leads to much lower diversification costs relative to a mean-variance based approach.
Several explanations have been brought forward for the home bias puzzle. The most popular ones are hedging country-specific risks, higher costs for foreign investments, information asymmetries, corporate governance and transparency and behavioral biases. We discuss each of these theories, but we conclude that no single one offers a complete solution to the home bias puzzle. We argue that portfolio decisions of investors are probably driven by a mixture of all explanations brought forward in this paper. This implies that home bias is complex and very hard to model theoretically; and portfolio allocation decisions will probably keep intriguing and inspiring researchers in the future.
